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Abstract: Although racial injustice and inequality are widely acknowledged in Brazil, 
recent experimental research concludes that citizens there do not rely on racial cues 
when voting. In this article, we test for the impact of candidate race on vote choice. We 
fi nd evidence of identity-based voting in Brazil that interacts with ballot size. When 
facing a short ballot with only a few candidates, most subjects chose candidates without 
regard to race or color. But when presented with a large ballot with many candidates, 
white and brown subjects show a signifi cant preference for same-race candidates. Self-
identifi ed black subjects, however, demonstrated a strong and consistent preference for 
black candidates regardless of choice set size. These results are particularly important 
given Brazil’s electoral rules that provide voters with overwhelming numbers of candi-
dates from which to choose.
Brazil has a long and complex history of race. Patterns of slavery, immigra-
tion, and years of intermarriage have created a diverse society, but one without 
the strong racial identities and politics found elsewhere.1 Political and intellec-
tual elites crafted Brazil’s national identity based on the existence of one group, 
the product of centuries of miscegenation, with a diverse set of phenotypic ap-
pearances.2 Furthermore, Brazil’s national identity includes elements of African, 
The authors thank Dr. George Avelino of the Fundação Getúlio Vargas for support and suggestions, as 
well as Eduardo Sato, Jaqueline Zulini, Marina Marcola, and Juliana Bueno for terrifi c fi eldwork and 
survey implementation. Funding was provided by a UCSD Committee on Research Grant.
1. Brazilians talk more in terms of “color” than in terms of “race” in social discourse (Htun 2004). As 
our work contributes to the race and politics literature, and we aim to enable a conversation with that 
literature, we use racial identity and color identity interchangeably. Both color and race are social con-
structs as there are not strong biological underpinnings for the way societies think about them, but they 
both have strong consequences as they generate attitudes and behaviors that affect people’s well-being 
based on their phenotypic appearances.
2. One intention of elites in motivating the miscegenation process was to reduce African infl uence in 
the population (Marx 1998).
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European, Asian, and native cultures. Perhaps for these reasons, Brazil for many 
years maintained a cultural myth of being a color-blind racial democracy (Sousa 
and Nascimento 2008; Htun 2004; Telles 2004). This was consistent with the 
broader literature on race and politics in Latin America, which had mostly rested 
on the assumption that cleavages in these societies are based on social class but 
not on race (Degler 1971; Freyre 1946; Pierson 1942; Tannenbaum 1947).
Beginning in the 1950s, Florestan Fernandes labeled the idea of racial democ-
racy in Brazil a myth (Telles 2004). Later, scholars would argue that race does 
affect political and social choices across Latin America but in more subtle ways 
than in the United States (Hanchard 1994; Marx 1998; Nobles 2000; Sawyer 2006; 
Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Telles 2004; Wade 1997). Race or color matters 
independent of socioeconomic status (Silva and Reis 2011), and it affects Afro-
Brazilians’ relations with state institutions such as the police force (Mitchell and 
Wood 1999). One of the obstacles in addressing discrimination based on pheno-
types is the all-inclusive national ideology in these countries that promotes the 
creation of a new racial group that overlaps with nationality. In the case of Brazil, 
most people think of themselves as members of one large national group with a 
high level of variation in people’s phenotypes as a result of high levels of inter-
racial mixing. In effect, there can be no racism if almost everyone is a product of 
racial intermixing.
Not all groups accepted the myth of racial democracy. In particular, black 
Brazilians have a long history of resistance to institutions of slavery and later, 
inequality and racism.3 Since democratization in the late 1980s, a growing black 
movement, or movimento negro, has sought to draw attention to the discrimination 
suffered by nonwhites and has pressured elites for policy changes to increase 
equality.4
The movimento negro, however, is not as large as one might expect given Bra-
zil’s large population of African origin. Scholars attribute the relatively small size 
of the movement to the fl uidity of color identity. Because color identities are fairly 
fl exible, anyone who can reasonably self-identify as nonblack does so because 
of the positive bias toward whiteness and because of the stigma associated with 
blackness (Bailey 2009; Telles 2004). Others have suggested that miscegenation 
has also prevented those of African descent from developing a distinct group 
identity as blacks (Hanchard 1994).
In spite of its limited size, the black movement has been successful in pushing 
for policy changes. Among Latin American countries, Brazil has taken an increas-
ingly proactive stance to confront and address racial inequalities. Historically, 
left-wing parties in Brazil have worked closely with black movement leaders to 
increase representation in government and public policies (Johnson 2006). Such 
alliances have been successful in producing affi rmative action policies in public 
schools and job opportunities over the last twenty years.
Interactions between an increasing awareness of racial inequalities and rac-
3. Especially notable were the quilombos, settlements of runaway slaves.
4. Darker-complexion Brazilians on average enjoy less access to education, lower life expectancy, 
lower wages, and even suffer discrimination in hiring and recruitment (IBGE 2010; IPEA 2000a, 2000b).
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ist attitudes, the pressure on the elites by the Brazilian black movement, and in-
ternational attention centered on the problem of racism have led to some policy 
changes. Most signifi cant is affi rmative action for the best universities and for 
some public hiring. These policies apply to all Afro-Brazilians, a category that 
includes self-identifi ed black (preto) and brown (pardo) individuals (Htun 2004). 
According to the most recent census, Afro-Brazilians constitute 51 percent of the 
population (IBGE 2010). Racial inequality extends into the political sphere. Elected 
offi cials are disproportionately white, and Afro-Brazilians are especially under-
represented among the political elite. In a study of the Brazilian Congress from 
1983 to 1999, Johnson (1998) fi nds ongoing and severe underrepresentation of 
 Afro-Brazilians in Congress and negative impacts of such underrepresentation 
on policy outcomes for Afro-Brazilians.
One possible explanation for the lack of diversity in elected positions is that 
prejudice among voters prevents the election of nonwhite candidates, but pre-
vious work on this question is limited. Most scholars have focused on turnout 
and support for democracy among Afro-Brazilians (Castro 1993; de Souza 1971; 
Lamounier 1968; Mitchell 2010; Prandi 1996; Soares and do Valle Silva 1987). Two 
exceptions are Berquó and Alencastro (1992) and Mitchell (2010), who fi nd that 
self-identifi ed Afro-Brazilians sometimes, but not always, express a preference for 
Afro-Brazilian candidates.
More recently, experimental work explores racial voting in Brazil, with surpris-
ing fi ndings: voters are not to blame for political inequality, and Brazilian voters 
are essentially color-blind. Dunning (2010) reports on tests for racial and class ef-
fects on candidate preference. He showed Brazilian subjects videos of candidates, 
randomly varying the race of the actors, portraying the candidate from white to 
black, and using their clothing and the content of their speech to vary social class. 
He fi nds that although candidates’ social class has a signifi cant treatment effect, 
with a positive bias for wealthier and better-educated candidates, there is no in-
dependent treatment effect of race on vote choice. This is surprising, given the 
inequalities in descriptive representation, and also poses a question—if Brazilian 
voters are color-blind, why is there so little diversity among political elites?
In this article, we address the relationship between identity and voting behav-
ior and contribute to the growing literature on race in Latin America. We test for 
the interaction of racial identity and ballot structure on voting behavior. Previ-
ous work has focused on simple two-candidate comparisons, but most entry-level 
political jobs in Brazil have dozens of candidates, and there are sometimes more 
than a thousand competing candidates on a legislative ballot.5 Drawing on re-
search from marketing and from political science, we argue that as ballot length 
increases, voters are overwhelmed by the challenges of making careful choices 
and fall back on simple cues, in this case, racial appearance. We test our hypoth-
eses using an experiment conducted in São Paulo in June, July, and August 2011. 
Subjects were asked to choose between hypothetical candidates; we randomly 
varied candidate race and ballot length.
5. There are usually approximately one thousand candidates for the seventy federal deputy seats in 
São Paulo. Each voter must choose just one.
P6751.indb   177 9/4/15   12:17:37 PM
178 Latin American Research Review
Our results fi nd a complex interaction between race and ballot structure. For 
self-identifi ed white and brown subjects, there are no race treatment effects for 
short ballots. But as the number of candidates increases, white and brown subjects 
fall back on race as an information shortcut and prefer white or black candidates, 
respectively. We interpret this effect as an implicit preference for same-race can-
didates. In contrast, self-identifi ed black subjects show a consistent bias for black 
candidates regardless of ballot length. We interpret this pattern as an explicit ra-
cial preference and hypothesize that it could be the consequence of higher group 
cohesion among those respondents who self-identifi ed as black. Both implications 
have striking parallels with research from the United States that has found la-
tent racist attitudes that confl ict with social norms of equality (Mendelberg 2001; 
Hutchings and Valentino 2004). Our results have implications for race in Brazil, 
institutional design, and the future of the Brazilian democracy.
In the next section, we synthesize the literature on race and group confl ict, 
consider its implications for Brazil, and discuss the potential interaction of iden-
tity and ballot structure. We then report on the experiment we conducted in São 
Paulo. Finally we discuss some limitations and implications of our research.
EXISTING RESEARCH AND THEORY
A vast literature seeks to explain intergroup confl ict, much of it examining 
race in the United States. Most of this literature fi ts in one of three broad theories 
of identity: social identity theory, social dominance theory, and system justifi ca-
tion theory. Our interest is in how these theories predict racial prejudice in vot-
ing. Thus we will outline each theory’s expectations for electoral behavior. We 
focus on the three predominant color or racial groups in Brazil: whites, blacks, 
and brown individuals.6
Social identity theory
According to this theory, identity develops from socially relevant attributes. 
Related empirical work shows that mere categorization is suffi cient to provoke in-
group bias and out-group prejudice (Billig and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and 
Turner 1979; Tajfel, Billig, and Bundy 1971). People have many identities—gender, 
race, nationality, and others—but only act on them when identities become rel-
evant. In addition, self-esteem is partly a product of identity. Thus individuals 
seek identities that make them feel good about themselves and discard those that 
do not. In some cases individuals are unable to change their group identity be-
cause groups are clearly delimited. In this case, if their group identifi cation is not 
socially valued, they may reinvent their identity to make it valuable (e.g., African 
Americans in the United States and the slogan “black is beautiful”).
According to Brazil’s national identity, everyone is fi rst and foremost Brazilian, 
6. We follow scholars on race in Brazil writing in the English language by referring to Brazilians of 
mixed race as “brown” (c.f. Mitchell 2009; Johnson 1998; Htun 2004; Telles 2007). This term is a transla-
tion of the category pardo used in the Brazilian census when asking respondents about their color.
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a product of centuries of miscegenation between different groups. In spite of this 
national ideology, Brazilians think of themselves as members of different color 
categories. If Brazil’s national ideology had been successful, these color categories 
would not have any political consequences. The myth that color does not matter 
in Brazil was fi rst challenged in the 1950s and largely discarded by the 1990s. A 
key part of the challenge to the racial myth was the black movement’s demonstra-
tion of color-based inequalities in economic and social outcomes. By almost every 
measure, Brazilians with darker skin have worse economic, education, and health 
outcomes than do white Brazilians.
Scholars have shown that the idea of racial democracy and the sense of dis-
crimination based on color coexist in Brazil (Telles 2004; Segato 1998). But while 
Brazil’s national identity includes African roots, society still ascribes a positive 
value to whiteness. Consequently, those individuals who can phenotypically 
identify with a nonblack category do so in order to derive higher self-esteem. 
Thus social identity theory suggests that most of the people who choose to iden-
tify as black do so because they believe in the struggle of the black movement, and 
they will prefer voting for black candidates.7 Voters who identify as white should 
prefer voting for white candidates because of the positive bias toward whiteness. 
The position of brown individuals under social identity theory is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, these individuals would derive higher self-esteem from associating 
with whites, who enjoy a higher social standing than blacks. On the other hand, 
evidence shows that their socioeconomic status is more closely related to blacks, 
as they are also grouped under the Afro-Brazilian category. Thus social identity 
theory predicts that if brown individuals seek to derive higher self-esteem they 
would likely vote for white candidates because they want to be closer to whites. 
In contrast, if they vote based on their socioeconomic status they might be more 
likely to vote for Afro-Brazilian (brown and black) candidates, who may provide 
better socioeconomic representation.
Social Dominance Theory
According to this theory, all societies are hierarchically organized by both gen-
der and race. The dominant group (usually male and, in the West, white) tends 
to justify its advantageous position in relation to the other groups based on the 
national ideology (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 1999; Sidanius et al. 2004). 
One foundation of this framework is that governmental institutions and ideolo-
gies are seen as mechanisms to maintain dominance over subordinated groups. A 
consequence is that subordinated groups do not feel a strong national attachment 
to or trust in governmental institutions (Pratto et al. 1994; Sidanius and Pratto 
1999; Sidanius et al. 2004).
Empirical work exploring this theory fi nds contradictory evidence (Sidanius, 
Peña, and Sawyer 2001; Sidanius et al. 1997; Sinclair, Sidanius, and Levin 1998). In 
contrast with the United States and Israel, in the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and 
7. Of course some voters will identify as black because of their phenotypic appearance, but previous 
work shows that if they could, many might identify as brown (Banton 1998).
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Puerto Rico darker-skinned people have been shown to be as or more patriotic 
than lighter-skinned people (Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius 2004). One possible rea-
son for this level of patriotism is the inclusion of all members of society in the na-
tional creed through the ideology of miscegenation. Further testing of this theory 
in Brazil will show if the results from the Caribbean prevail there.
Research in Brazil points out the inclusiveness of the country’s national ideol-
ogy, as it includes African, European, and native elements (Degler 1971; Pierson 
1942). In spite of such inclusiveness, members of the black movement argue that 
the ideology of miscegenation maintains nonwhite people at the bottom of the 
social hierarchy and prevents their mobilization and political organization. In 
terms of voting, social dominance implies that voters will vote for members of 
their own group—the dominators in order to continue domination, and the dis-
advantaged group to try to change the status quo. Thus nonwhite voters should 
vote for nonwhite candidates while white voters should vote for white candidates; 
that is, same-color voting.8
System Justifi cation Theory
This theory is similar to the social dominance approach in that it conceives 
societies to be hierarchically organized. The disagreement is that according to 
system justifi cation theory, members of discriminated groups internalize stereo-
types and believe their social situation is justifi able (Jost, Banaji, and Nosek 2004). 
Research in Mexico shows that indigenous-looking voters are more likely than 
white voters to vote for white-looking candidates and tend to evaluate those can-
didates more positively than white voters do. Moreover, Mexicans tend to ascribe 
more negative traits to dark-skinned than to light-skinned individuals (Agui-
lar 2009, 2011).
In the case of Brazil, for most of the twentieth century, national identity rested 
on the idea that no one discriminates against others based on racial appearance. 
Although Brazilian society now acknowledges color discrimination, Brazilians 
also value the ideas of miscegenation and of a racism-free society (Telles 2004). 
Thus, if there is a preference for whiteness among some nonwhite Brazilians, they 
should tend to vote for white candidates more than for nonwhite ones. In the case 
of nonwhite individuals who share the ideas of the black movement and identify 
as black we can expect more support for black candidates as they will be conscious 
of the positive bias toward whiteness. Furthermore, these voters will not justify 
their unequal position vis-à-vis whites, as system justifi cation theory predicts.
When Are Racial Identities Activated in Politics?
In practice, racial identity will frequently compete with other political identi-
ties, including partisanship, economic interest, ideology, and religion. In addition, 
social norms of equality may dissuade voters from explicitly using racial charac-
8. Of course, people from the dominated group might not trust the electoral process, but if given the 
option to vote for a member of their group they would do so.
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teristics when choosing candidates. But when there are secondary or latent racial 
preferences and few clear cues to guide voting behavior, voters may fall back on 
these preferences when choosing candidates. Racial preferences might require 
some deliberate activation through media messages (Mendelberg 2001) or might 
simply be the most accessible cue in some circumstances.
A key part of our experiment is an analysis of the way that features of the elec-
toral environment affect the use of racial identity in voting. We propose that racial 
identity’s impact on behavior will increase as voting becomes more complex and 
burdensome for citizens. Essentially, race remains an easy-to-use information 
shortcut for many voters. When voting decisions are diffi cult, voters will rely on 
racial identities more and political identities less.9
We focus on the cognitive challenges provided to voters by large choice sets—
elections with many candidates and low information. Across political systems, 
voters face diverse informational challenges, depending on the strength of parti-
san brands, the length of political campaigns, and most important for this study, 
the number of candidates.10 Just within Latin America, we observe wide variance 
in the number of candidates. In some contexts, there are rarely more than two 
candidates, yet in Brazilian legislative elections, voters may face as many as one 
thousand candidates in a single district. This abundance of candidates results 
largely from political institutions—high-magnitude legislative districts, low costs 
for candidates’ entry, and high thresholds for the number of candidates per party 
list—as well as Brazil’s fragmented party system. As Carey and Hix (2011) ob-
serve, the cognitive challenges facing voters in systems like Brazil’s have received 
very little attention in political science.
Previous work in other fi elds shows how choice set size can have powerful ef-
fects on decision making (Iyengar and Lepper 2000; Iyengar and Kamenica 2010; 
Schwartz et al. 2002). In one study, Iyengar and Kamenica (2010) show that when 
presented with larger choice sets when selecting 401k plans, experimental sub-
jects tended to avoid complexity and risk. In another study, Lenton and Fran-
cesconi (2010) analyze speed-dating events and fi nd that participants presented 
with larger numbers of potential mates were more likely to rely on “quick and 
easy cues,” including age, height, and weight, when assessing potential mates. 
Respondents who were presented with fewer candidates, on the other hand, were 
more likely to rely on less quick and easy cues, including occupation or education. 
In political science, recent work fi nds that voters are more likely to abstain when 
presented with more candidates, and that the presence of party labels does little 
to mitigate this effect (Cunow 2014).
We hypothesize that ballot size will have different effects on voters’ electoral 
decisions, following the theories of intergroup confl ict previously discussed. First, 
we will test whether voters’ racial identities are strong, affecting their behavior 
9. Of course racial and political identity can in many cases be strongly related. These two identities 
can be more related when race or color differences refl ect disparities among members of different cat-
egories, as it is the case in Brazil (i.e., differences between whites and Afro-Brazilians.)
10. Voter characteristics, including education, may also infl uence the extent to which elections are 
challenging (Gallego 2010).
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even when they have to decide among only a few candidates. If racial cues trigger 
voters’ racial identities when they can compare candidates more carefully and at 
a low cost, then those identities are highly relevant for voters. In this scenario, 
according to social identity and social dominance theories voters should always 
prefer candidates from their own group over candidates from other groups. In 
contrast, social justifi cation theory would predict that all voters will prefer white 
candidates—white voters will vote for a member of their group to maintain their 
privilege and nonwhite voters will vote for a white politician because they believe 
white politicians are more capable than members of their own groups.
In case racial identities are not strong enough to affect voting decisions with 
a few candidates, we will test whether they do affect voters when they are pre-
sented with many candidates. We hypothesize that ballot size affects the way 
voters make use of or ignore sociodemographic cues, especially latent cues, when 
making electoral decisions. If voters’ racial attitudes are weak or latent, they 
should not be activated when confronting a small choice set. When facing ten or 
more candidates, fi nding an optimal candidate is diffi cult for most voters, in addi-
tion to being exceedingly costly. In this context, voters should fall back on simple 
cues that could trigger one of their identities—including racial identity—and use 
those cues to make decisions.11 The experiment we employ varies candidate race 
and the size of choice sets simultaneously to allow us to test the relationship be-
tween candidate race and ballot length.
HYPOTHESES
The above discussion suggests the following hypotheses to be tested:
Hypothesis 1: Brazilian voters will vote according to their own racial identifi cation (in-
group bias) and will tend to punish members of other groups (out-group prejudice), follow-
ing both social identity and social dominance theories.
Hypothesis 2: Brazilian voters will vote for white candidates according to system justifi ca-
tion theory. The exception would be Brazilians who identify with the black movement, who 
should be more likely to vote for black candidates.
Hypothesis 3: Whatever the racial identity construct, Brazilian voters should rely more 
on racial cues as the number of candidates increases and voting decisions become more 
diffi cult.
In the next section, we present our experimental design and discuss implementa-
tion, balance, and treatments.
METHODOLOGY
To test the relationship between the race of political candidates and vote choice 
(hypotheses 1–3), we conducted a survey experiment in São Paulo, Brazil, from 
11. This reliance on cues may be entirely rational. A low-information rationale and reliance on in-
formation shortcuts can be a highly effective means by which voters can make rational choices without 
acquiring information about options (Popkin 1991; Lupia 1994).
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Table 1 Summary statistics
Sample
Age 
Median 29
Education
x < primary 7.2%
Primary ≤ x < middle 13.1%
Middle ≤ x < high 59.1%
High ≤ x 20.7%
Income
x < R500 7.3%
R500 ≤ x < R1500 30.7%
R1500 ≤ x < R3000 31.6%
R3000 ≤ x 30.5%
Political interest
None 22.8%
A little 42.4%
Interested 25.8%
Very interested 9.1%
June to August 2011.12 A total of 1,175 adults participated. Subjects were sampled 
in a diverse set of busy commercial areas across the city including the Avenida 
Paulista, Vila Mariana, Liberdade, Tatuapé, and the Centro. Respondents were 
asked to participate in an academic study about political attitudes.13
Respondent characteristics are summarized in table 1. Political interest and 
education variables are measured on four-point scales with one representing 
the lowest and four representing the highest values of the variable. The median 
respondent was twenty-nine years old, earned between R$1,500 and R$3,000 
monthly, had completed less than a high school education, and had only a little 
interest in politics. This sample was slightly younger, wealthier, and better edu-
cated than the universe of São Paulo residents.
Survey respondents were presented with profi les of hypothetical candidates 
and asked which of the presented candidates they preferred. Candidate profi les 
included candidates’ names, photos, brief biographies, and policy positions. Sub-
jects were also asked a set of questions about their own income, education, politi-
cal interest, party affi liation, and race.
12. The black movement has been active in São Paulo since the 1930s, making it an interesting place 
to research racial attitudes (Covin 2006; Hanchard 1994; Mitchell 2010).
13. The completion rate for respondents who began the survey was 95 percent. We do not have a 
precise measure of the survey response rate. We estimate that half of adults approached chose to par-
ticipate in the survey.
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We randomized two variables: candidate race and ballot length. Respondents 
were randomly assigned to conditions in which they were presented with three, 
six, or twelve candidates. For each ballot size, one-third of candidates’ races were 
varied by changing their photographs; the other two-thirds of hypothetical can-
didates were held constant. The pictures were randomly varied to show white, 
black, brown, or Japanese males. There was also one experimental condition with 
no photos at all. All other information about the candidates was held constant 
across experiment conditions.14
Table 2 presents the nine experimental conditions into which respondents were 
assigned. Figure 1 shows sample candidate profi les from the three- candidate con-
dition with all white candidates and from the condition with white and black 
candidates.15
RESULTS
Figure 2 reports on the randomization, showing sample means and 95 percent 
confi dence intervals for our six covariates across the experimental treatment con-
ditions. None differed signifi cantly across the six treatment conditions, confi rm-
ing that the randomization was successful.
We also assessed subjects’ perceptions of realism. The fi nal survey question 
asked voters if the profi les of the candidates were similar to or different from the 
profi les of the candidates in the last election. Figure 3 shows responses: 83 per-
cent of respondents reported that the experimental candidates were the same 
(67.67 percent) or only a little different (14.92 percent). Indeed, many respondents 
reported being familiar with or knowing them despite the candidates being com-
pletely hypothetical!16
14. The last name of the Japanese candidate was also changed to refl ect the candidate’s ethnicity.
15. The original conditions were printed in full color. Copies of the originals are available from the 
authors.
16. This reported familiarity with the candidates may also suggest some social desire on the part of 
respondents to appear knowledgeable about politics. It also refl ects the low-information environment 
that characterizes Brazilian legislative elections, in which many voters have only very limited knowl-
edge of many of their options.
Table 2 Experimental conditions
Number of candidates Race of candidates
3 No photos
3 All white
3 White and black
3 White and Japanese
3 White and mixed race
6 All white
6 White and black
12 All white
12 White and black
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Figure 1 Three-candidate conditions: (a) white Fernando (b) black Fernando
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Figure 2 Covariate balance across treatment conditions
Figure 3 How different are survey candidates and candidates in the last election?
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Only 8.3 percent of subjects found our candidates very different, and of these, 
few could describe any differences when asked. The few who could state why 
our hypothetical candidates were different usually reported that the policy posi-
tions of the hypothetical candidates were too well defi ned or that the candidates 
were too well educated. Coincidentally, the format of our candidate profi les was 
also strikingly similar to a profi le of an interim cabinet minister that appeared in 
a major Brazilian newspaper while the survey was being conducted (Nery and 
Falcão 2011).
These fi gures provide confi dence that the candidate profi les in the survey were 
suffi ciently realistic. We note that most legislative candidates have low name rec-
ognition, almost no media coverage, and extremely limited television advertising 
time; most legislative candidates have no more than a few seconds of advertising 
time during which they quickly state their name, party, and perhaps one other 
piece of information. The brief time that survey respondents spent evaluating the 
hypothetical candidates may be a reasonable approximation of how much expo-
sure voters have to legislative candidates.
We now turn to our main results. Simple cross tabulations of the data show 
no treatment effect of candidate race, supporting the notion of Brazil as a racial 
democracy. Table 3 shows results from all the three-candidate conditions with no 
picture, black, white, brown, and Japanese candidates. The cells report the pro-
portion of subjects voting for the candidate (Fernando) whose race was varied 
in each of the conditions. The results suggest two main fi ndings. First, race ap-
pears not to matter to Brazilian voters. The proportion voting for Fernando (the 
“treatment” candidate) barely varies from 0.18 to 0.22 across all conditions with 
pictures, and these differences are not signifi cant (p-value for a chi-squared test = 
0.94). Second, Brazilian voters appear not to like any of our pictures of Fernando, 
as his vote share is substantially higher in the no-picture treatment than in any 
other condition!
Our next hypotheses address the size of the choice set. Previous work (Iyen-
gar and Kamenica 2010; Lenton and Francesconi 2010; Cunow 2014) has shown 
how individuals make less careful choices or rely on simpler cues when their 
options increase. We hypothesized that while race might not affect vote choice 
Table 3 Proportion voting for treatment candidate by race: 
Three-candidate condition
Treatment candidate picture
No picture White Brown Black Japanese
Treatment 0.28 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.21
Control 0.72 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.79
n 151 160 145 152 155
Notes: With “no picture”: Chi-square: 4.62; p value: 0.33
Without “no picture”: Chi-square: 0.39; p value: 0.94
None of these differences reach conventional levels of statistical 
signifi cance.
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when faced with only three candidates, as the number of candidates increases 
and subjects are overwhelmed with information, we expect they will fall back on 
easily accessible cues. One obvious cue would be race (we did not provide infor-
mation about the party affi liations of the candidates in this experiment, and in 
fact, most legislative candidates’ advertisements do not mention party identifi ca-
tion) (Desposato 2013).
Table 4 shows the proportion of subjects voting for the treatment candidates 
when subjects had to choose between three, six, or twelve candidates in total. In 
each treatment, one-third of the candidates were treatment candidates, meaning 
we varied their photographs. For the larger choice sets, we only varied black and 
white candidates; for comparability, in the following paragraphs, we focus only 
on the black- and white-candidate treatments for all choice set sizes.
The results are consistent with table 3; there is no evidence of racially moti-
vated voting in aggregate analysis. In this case, there is a consistent pattern of a 
slight pro-black bias in voting; the proportion voting for Fernando when black 
is consistently higher than the proportion voting for Fernando when white, and 
this gap increases with the number of candidates from less than 3 percent for 
three candidates to almost 8 percent for the twelve-candidate condition. However, 
this pattern is not statistically signifi cant. Taken together, tables 3 and 4 reveal no 
aggregate racial preference among Brazilian voters, supporting the core idea of 
racial democracy.
The results change fundamentally, however, when we control for subjects’ ra-
cial self-identifi cation: we fi nd a signifi cant preference for candidates whose race 
matches subjects’ identity. Consider fi rst table 5. The values in the table are the 
proportion voting for the treatment candidates as a function of the number of 
candidates (rows), the race of the candidate (columns) and the self-identifi ed race 
of the subject (groups of columns). Values in parentheses are the number of sub-
jects in each treatment, and asterisks denote the signifi cance level of the treatment 
effect from a difference-in-proportions test.
Table 4 Proportion voting for treatment 
candidates by candidate race and by number 
of candidates
Candidate race
White Black Difference
3 0.181 0.211 0.029
(160) (152)
6 0.243 0.276 0.033
(144) (152)
12 0.172 0.252 0.079
(145) (159)
All 0.198 0.246 0.048
(449) (463)
Note: None of these differences reach conventional 
levels of statistical signifi cance.
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These results show divergent patterns in candidate preferences as a function of 
identity and the number of candidates. For blacks, there is a consistent and usually 
signifi cant preference for nonwhite candidates: about 40 percent of blacks chose a 
black candidate regardless of ballot length; voting for white treatment candidates 
was consistently lower. For the three-candidate condition, a black Fernando’s vote 
share is nearly four times greater than the vote share of white Fernando; for the 
six-candidate condition, the two treatment candidates get 42 percent more votes 
when black than when white, and for the twelve-candidate condition, the four 
treatment candidates’ vote shares more than double when the candidates are 
black compared to when they are white. All these differences are signifi cant at 
the 0.05 level.
For whites and self-identifi ed browns, there appears to be an interaction be-
tween choice set size and preferences. For both races, there is no apparent treat-
ment effect in the three-candidate condition; white voters have a two- percentage-
point preference for white candidates; brown subjects have a two-percentage-point 
preference for black candidates, and neither gap is signifi cant.
As choice set size increases, however, so do the gaps. There is little change 
from three to six candidates, but from six to twelve candidates, there is a large in-
crease in preference for same- race candidates. For whites in the twelve-candidate 
condition, there is a ten-percentage-point increase in votes for the treatment can-
didates when they are white versus when they are black; this preference doubles 
self-identifi ed whites’ preference for those treatment candidates. This difference, 
however, does not reach conventional levels of signifi cance with just 118 sub-
jects in the two twelve-candidate treatments. For brown subjects exposed to the 
twelve-candidate conditions, there is a thirteen-percentage-point gap, signifi cant 
at the 0.05 level, between preference for the treatment candidates when they are 
black versus when they are white. Again, this nearly doubles those candidates’ 
vote shares.
To further explore these relationships, we ran a series of logistic regressions, 
shown in tables 6 and 7. The dependent variable in each of these models is a 
dummy variable “Voted for Treatment,” coded “1” if the subject voted for one 
of our treatment candidates and “0” if the subject voted for one of our control 
candidates with invariant race. We constructed three sets of models to estimate 
the impacts of increasingly nuanced racial effects. Note that all models include 
controls for age, gender, education, and interest in politics, though these controls 
are not always shown. Further, age is operationalized as a dummy variable for 
“40 or older” (coded 0 for subjects under 40 years of age). Our coding captures 
the difference between subjects who became adults under authoritarian rule and 
those who became adults under democratic rule.
In the fi rst two models (1 and 2, table 6), there are no controls for the respon-
dents’ race, just controls for the candidate race and number of candidates. There 
were no signifi cant racial effects in these models.
In the second set of models (3 and 4, table 6), we test for same-race prefer-
ences. We defi ne an indicator variable, Congruent Race, coded 1 if the subject 
and the treatment candidates’ have the same race and 0 if their races differ. For 
example, when the subject self-identifi es as white and the treatment candidates 
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are randomly assigned to have white pictures, Congruent Race is coded 1. When 
subjects are not white, and the treatment candidates are also nonwhite, we also 
code the same-race indicator as 1. As we have discussed, previous research shows 
that browns and blacks have similar life experiences, so they are usually grouped 
under the Afro-Brazilian category (Htun 2004; Telles 2004).
The results from model 4 suggest a strong interaction between racial iden-
tity, candidate race, and ballot size. We provide a more intuitive presentation in 
fi gure 4. The fi gure shows the marginal effect of the main treatment (having a 
black versus white candidate) as a function of ballot length.17 Note that for small 
ballots—those with just three candidates—there are no racial effects. The mar-
ginal effect of a same-race candidate has an estimate very close to zero, and the 
95 percent confi dence interval straddles the zero or “no effect” line. Subjects are 
equally likely to choose candidates with the same or different races as their own. 
However, as the number of candidates increases, the role of same-race candidates 
also increases. With six candidates, there is a positive effect, though it is not sig-
17. The y axis is measured as the linear impact on the latent variable. Abbreviating Congruent Race 
as Icr and given the original model of:
Y = β0 + β1 Icr + β2 m + β3 Icr ∗ m + Xβ + ε
where Icr is the indicator variable for same race, m is the number of candidates, Xβ are controls, and ε is 
iid logistic, the marginal effect of a racially congruent candidate given number of candidates m is: ∂Y / 
∂Icr = β1 + β3 ∗ m.
Table 6 Voting for treatment candidates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Black Candidate 0.248 0.0138
(1.49) (0.04)
Number of Candidates −0.0205 −0.00551 −0.0520
(−0.61) (−0.25) (−1.52)
Black Cand × Num Cand 0.0335
(0.75)
Congruent Race 0.321* −0.259
(1.92) (−0.73)
Congruent Race × Num Cand 0.0836* 
(1.85)
Woman 0.0783 0.0807 0.0789 0.0882
(0.46) (0.48) (0.47) (0.52)
Political Interest 0.00896 0.00824 0.0125 0.0101
(0.10) (0.09) (0.13) (0.11)
Education −0.223** −0.218** −0.213** −0.216** 
(−2.17) (−2.11) (−2.06) (−2.09)
Over 40 Years −0.455** −0.4648** −0.470** −0.475** 
(−2.23) (−2.27) (−2.30) (−2.32)
Constant −0.657* −0.528 −0.675* −0.364
(−1.78) (−1.25) (−1.71) (−0.85)
Observations 834 834 834 834
Note: t statistics in parentheses.
*p < .10; **p < .05.
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Figure 4 Marginal effects of congruent candidates
nifi cant at the 95 percent level. However, by the time ballot length has grown to 
twelve candidates, subjects show a signifi cant bias toward candidates that share 
their group identity status.
For a more substantive illustration of impact, we compare the probability that 
a hypothetical individual with all control variables set to median values will 
vote for a treatment candidate, varying the number of candidates and whether 
the individual and treatment candidate are of the same race. When there are just 
three candidates, the probability of voting for a treatment candidate is essentially 
unchanged regardless of race: the probability is 0.256 for a same-race candidate 
and 0.257 for a different-race candidate. When there are twelve candidates, the 
probability of voting for a treatment candidate increases to 0.31 for a same-race 
candidate and falls to 0.18 for a different-race candidate.
We tested a more nuanced story in models 1 and 2 in table 7. In these models, 
we test separately for treatment effects for self-identifi ed white, brown, and black 
respondents, following the patterns observed in table 5. We also interact age and 
the race of the candidate to test for generational differences. There are multiple 
and messy interactions in the model. The baseline racial category is the brown 
group, so the interactions capture differences between white and brown, and be-
tween black and brown respondents. Again, because their meaning is diffi cult for 
most to decipher from the table directly, we provide fi gure 4 to illustrate the mar-
ginal effect of having a black (versus white) treatment candidate for each racial 
group and each ballot size.18
18. The reader may be wondering about the few signifi cant coeffi cients in the tables and the appar-
ent contradiction with the signifi cant fi ndings presented in the fi gures. It is essential to remember that 
the marginal effect of any variable and its signifi cance depend on any main effects and interactions in 
which it participates. For example, given a simple linear model:
Y = β0 + β1 x1 + β2 x2 + β3 x1 x2
the estimated marginal effect of x1 is βˆ1 + βˆ3 x2 , and the standard error of that marginal effect is
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Table 7 Voting for treatment candidates accounting for respondent race
Model 1 Model 2
Black Candidate −0.521 −0.304
(−1.00) (−0.57)
Number of Candidates −0.0650 −0.0616
(−1.24) (−1.17)
Black Cand × Num Cand 0.107 0.106
(1.56) (1.54)
White Respondent −0.487 −0.496
(−0.84) (−0.86)
White Respondent × Black Cand 0.956 0.959
(1.22) (1.22)
White Respondent × Num Cand 0.0619 0.0651
(0.84) (0.88)
White Respondent × Num Cand × Black Cand −0.183* −0.190* 
(−1.80) (−1.86)
Black Respondent −0.885 −0.894
(−1.16) (−1.18)
Black Respondent × Black Cand 1.742 1.789
(1.61) (1.64)
Black Respondent × Num Cand 0.113 0.113
(1.16) (1.17)
Black Respondent × Num Cand × Black Cand −0.118 −0.117
(−0.91) (−0.89)
Over 40 Years −0.518** −0.0604
(−2.49) (−0.21)
Age × Black Cand −0.918** 
(−2.23)
Constant −0.266 −0.394
(−0.53) (−0.78)
Observations 834 834
Notes: Some control variables not shown. 
t statistics in parentheses.
*p < .10; **p < .05.
The marginal effects mirror the descriptive analysis above but only some-
times reach conventional signifi cance levels. For self-identifi ed black respon-
dents, the marginal effect of a black candidate is a signifi cant increase in the 
propensity to choose that candidate. For black respondents under forty years 
of age, that increase in preference has nothing to do with ballot size, however; 
it is remarkably steady across the number of candidates and is signifi cant at the 
95 percent level for every ballot size tested. These results suggest an explicit and 
deliberate preference for black candidates among self-identifi ed, young black 
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See Brambor, Clark, and Golder (2006) for an extended discussion.
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voters. For older black respondents, the effect is still consistent but smaller and 
no longer signifi cant. This fi nding supports the research that shows that younger 
Brazilians tend to identify as black (negro) more than older Brazilians, and they 
are also more infl uenced by the black movement than older people (Bailey and 
Telles 2006; Sansone 2003). Furthermore, using survey data, Mitchell (2010) 
shows that as Afro-Brazilians get older they tend to report fewer experiences of 
racism than younger Brazilians. All this evidence explains the strong preference 
of young and self-identifi ed black Brazilians for black candidates, regardless of 
ballot size.
For white and brown respondents, there are interactions between the num-
ber of candidates and the presence of a black candidate, mirroring the same-race 
results discussed above. For white respondents, increasing the number of candi-
dates leads to a negative treatment effect: those respondents become less likely to 
choose the treatment candidate if he is black. In addition, these effects are largest 
Figure 5 Marginal effect of black candidate by ballot size, respondent race, and respondent 
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for older white subjects and weaker for younger white subjects, but they never 
reach conventional levels of signifi cance.
For brown respondents, increasing the number of candidates leads to a posi-
tive treatment effect: those respondents are more likely to choose a treatment can-
didate when he is black. Results for brown respondents are signifi cant, but only 
for the twelve-candidate case with younger respondents.
The results suggest two patterns of racial voting. For white and brown respon-
dents, when facing just three choices, their decisions appear to have nothing to 
do with race. This is consistent with our observations that subjects in the three-
 candidate treatments would carefully consider the biographies and positions of 
the candidates. In fact they took longer on average to examine their three can-
didates than other subjects took to examine all twelve candidates! When asked 
about their motivations for choosing candidates, those in the three-candidate 
condition had substantive reasons, including candidates’ positions on specifi c is-
sues or their educational or professional backgrounds. As the number of candi-
dates increased, however, subjects took less time to choose a candidate, were more 
likely to “just pick one,” and made fewer mentions of substantive reasons. In other 
words, when faced with a daunting analysis problem, our subjects made the deci-
sion to use a shortcut, rather than tackle the diffi cult challenge of picking the ideal 
candidate from all twelve. With less ability to analyze issues, subjects fell back on 
simple decision-making cues like race, which triggered their racial identities.
For black respondents, there appears to be a strong and deliberate favorable 
response to black candidates, and this response is apparent even when subjects 
are not overwhelmed by information. This is consistent with the message of the 
growing black movement in Brazil. In Brazil, people’s decision of how to identify 
is often highly political.19 On the one hand, the brown category stresses Brazil’s 
national ideology, which rests on interracial mixing. On the other hand, identi-
fying as black puts the individual in opposition to such ideology. It should not 
be surprising, then, that research shows that people who identify as blacks tend 
to be more educated than those who identify as brown (Telles 2004; Bailey and 
Telles 2006). People who self-identify as blacks tend to have a stronger identity 
with their group than brown individuals, who most likely feel ambiguous about 
identifying as black or white. Indeed, in political campaigns, black candidates 
often make explicit appeals to the black movement for support (Mitchell 2009). 
Therefore we can expect that self-identifi ed blacks will be more likely to support 
black candidates, while brown individuals will feel ambiguous about them and 
support them only when they rely on cues (Bailey and Telles 2006).
DISCUSSION
We have three central fi ndings. First, when faced with small choice sets, self-
identifi ed white and brown subjects had no signifi cant racial preference in voting. 
Second, as the size of the choice set grew, both white and brown subjects showed 
19. As we mention above, in some cases identifi cation may be entirely based on phenotype.
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increasing preferences for same-race candidates. Finally, self-identifi ed black 
subjects showed strong and consistent preferences for black candidates across all 
choice set sizes. In other words, racial or color identifi cation is stronger among 
self-identifi ed black voters and weaker among self-identifi ed brown and white 
voters. Racial identity is always salient for self-identifi ed blacks and is salient for 
self-identifi ed white and brown voters when the number of candidates competing 
in the election is large.
The results of our experiment provide support for both social identity theory 
and social dominance theory: Brazilians tend to prefer candidates from their 
own racial group, and brown individuals are more likely to prefer black can-
didates only when they are presented with many options. As we discuss else-
where, brown individuals’ status is closer to that of blacks than to that of whites 
in Brazil, so it should not be surprising that they tend to prefer black candidates 
(Telles 2007). The results of our analysis of the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey 
indicate that black Brazilians are no less patriotic than white or brown Brazil-
ians (LAPOP 2010).20 This evidence echoes other work in the Dominican Republic, 
Cuba, and Puerto Rico that shows that national ideologies in Latin America tend 
to be more inclusionary than in the United States (Sidanius, Peña, and Sawyer 
2001; Sawyer, Peña, and Sidanius 2004). Thus, based on the experiment and sur-
vey results, social identity theory better explains electoral behavior among mem-
bers of different racial/color groups in Brazil.
Our fi ndings show that race matters for voting behavior in Brazil, especially as 
the set of options increases in low-information elections such as legislative ones. 
We did not fi nd evidence to support the idea that nonwhite Brazilians would 
prefer voting for white candidates, as system justifi cation theory would claim 
and as research in other countries in Latin America has shown (Jost, Banaji, and 
Nosek 2004; Aguilar 2009).
Our results also fi t well with existing research on the campaign strategies of 
candidates for local and federal legislative offi ces in Brazil. Mitchell (2009) fi nds 
that some, but not all, Afro-Brazilian legislative candidates employ Afro-Brazilian 
cultural symbols and racial cues in their campaigns, referring to racial discrimina-
tion and even black social movements in the United States and South Africa when 
targeting voters. This work suggests that some candidates target voters based on 
Afro-Brazilian identity and that self-identifi ed black Brazilians might rely on can-
didate race when selecting representatives because it is in fact a somewhat reliable 
signal (or at least of higher quality than other quick cues) for those voters.
Some of the nuances of our results are intriguing but will require more re-
search in the future. We note three reasons for caution in our interpretation. First, 
our results need replication and expansion to generalize to all of Brazil and be-
yond. Our limited sample size spread across nine treatments means that our tests 
20. The survey consists of 2,482 respondents. Respondents answered two questions related to pa-
triotism: whether they felt proud of being Brazilians and whether they felt proud of living under the 
Brazilian political system. Looking at differences of means among racial groups on these two variables 
we did not fi nd statistical differences. There are no discernible differences between white, brown, and 
black individuals in regard to feeling proud of being Brazilian (F = 0.20, p value = 0.28) or expressing 
pride of living under the Brazilian political system (F = 1.39, p value = 0.25).
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have limited power. Some intriguing patterns were only signifi cant at the 0.10 
level. Related to this, our study pool is neither a random sample of all paulistanos 
nor of all Brazilians. A larger sample of poorer Brazilians might yield very differ-
ent results, and studies in other states in Brazil with very different demographics 
would be instructive. Further investigation with larger and more diverse subject 
pools is required.
Second, the age-differentiated results are also suggestive but have many pos-
sible explanations. We found that age interacts with candidate race in determin-
ing vote choice. The racial effects noted above were strongest for young voters 
and weaker for older voters. We believe that this refl ects the new discourse and 
experiences in Brazil since democratization. Discourse since the 1990s argues that 
Afro-Brazilians face discrimination based on color in many areas of their lives, 
so younger voters socialized under this new discourse might be more willing to 
accept such ideas and rely more on their racial/color identity when voting than 
older voters who grew up under the ideology of a racial democracy. The change 
in discourse could also strengthen the position of the black movement among 
younger Brazilians.
Third, our research design does not allow us to compare the magnitude of 
racial effects with those provided by other cues, like gender, party identifi cation, 
or social networks. These other factors may have larger or small effects than race, 
and future work should parse out the relative impact of these different cues.
A key innovation in this experiment was that of varying choice set sizes. Bra-
zilian electoral institutions ensure that there are many candidates for most elected 
offi ces. There are usually at least fi ve, even for most single-member district elec-
tions. Brazil’s multiparty system, OLPR (open list proportional representation) 
rules, and large districts mean that legislative elections may force voters to choose 
between as many as one thousand candidates. Our results indicate that an in-
crease from three to only twelve candidates signifi cantly changed patterns of vot-
ing behavior, increasing most voters’ reliance on simple racial cues that triggered 
their racial identities instead of voting based on candidates’ policy positions.
Finally, returning to our opening question about the disproportionately low 
number of nonwhite representatives, although we have found evidence of racial 
identity voting, it should not prevent the election of nonwhite representatives. 
More than 50 percent of Brazilians identify as nonwhite as of the last census, and in 
the high-magnitude, low-information environments of Brazilian legislative elec-
tions, nonwhite candidacies should resonate and generate support among same-
race constituencies. However, in the recent Congresses only a small percentage 
of federal deputies self-identifi ed as black. In 2006, 25 of 513 deputies did so (less 
than 5 percent), while in 2010 this number increased to 43 (8.4 percent) (Braga and 
Nascimento 2011).21 This suggests that any barriers to nonwhite candidates’ elec-
toral success are not based in voter bias against such candidates. Instead, barriers 
must exist elsewhere—in the distribution of campaign resources, patterns of can-
didate recruitment, or even more fundamentally in educational and professional 
opportunities that are prerequisites for strong campaigns. Future work could ex-
21. We know of no similar data for the very large pool of candidates running for legislative offi ce.
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plore the supply and quality of nonwhite candidates to reconcile the apparent 
demand for nonwhite representatives and the dearth of successful candidacies.
REFERENCES
Aguilar, Rosario
2009 “The Political Consequences of Prejudice among Mexicans and Mexican Ameri-
cans.” PhD diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
2011 “Social and Political Consequences of Stereotypes Related to Racial Phenotypes in 
Mexico.” Working Paper, CIDE DTEP-230. Mexico City: Centro de Investigación y 
Docencia Económicas.
Bailey, Stanley R.
2009 Legacies of Race: Identities, Attitudes, and Politics in Brazil. Stanford, CA: Stanford Uni-
versity Press.
Bailey, Stanley R., and Edward E. Telles
2006 “Multiracial versus Collective Black Categories: Examining Census Classifi cation 
Debates in Brazil.” Ethnicities 6 (1): 74–101.
Banton, Michael
1998 Racial Theories. London: Cambridge University Press.
Berquó, Elza, and Luiz Felipe de Alencastro
1992 “A emergência do voto negro.” Novos Estudos 33:77–88.
Billig, Michael, and Henri Tajfel
1973 “Social Categorization and Similarity in Intergroup Behavior.” European Journal of 
Social Psychology 3 (1): 27–52.
Braga, Alexandre, and Adilson Nascimento
2011 “Balanço eleitoral do voto étnico negro e presença dos negros no parlamento.” Pu-
blicação da União de Negros Pela Igualdade. February 2011. http://congressoemfoco
.uol.com.br/upload/congresso/arquivo/balanco%20negro%20eleicoes.pdf.
Brambor, Thomas, William Roberts Clark, and Matt Golder
2006 “Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses.” Political 
Analysis 14 (1): 63–82.
Carey, John M., and Simon Hix
2011 “The Electoral Sweet Spot: Low-Magnitude Proportional Electoral Systems.” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science 55 (2): 383–397.
Castro, Mônica M. M. de
1993 “Raça e comportamento político.” Dados 36 (3): 469–491.
Covin, David
2006 The Unifi ed Black Movement in Brazil, 1978–2002. Jefferson, NC: McFarland.
Cunow, Saul
2014 “Vote Choice in Complex Electoral Environments.” PhD diss., University of Cali-
fornia, San Diego.
Degler, Carl N.
1971 Neither Black nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States. New 
York: Macmillan.
de Souza, Amaury
1971 “Raça e política no Brasil urbano.” Revista de Administração de Empresas 11 (4): 
61–70.
Desposato, Scott W.
2013 “The Impact of Electoral Market Type on Campaign Strategy.” Paper pre-
sented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Au-
gust 29– September 1, Chicago, IL.
Dunning, Thad
2010 “Race, Class, and Voter Preferences in Brazil.” Paper presented at the annual meet-
ing of the Latin American Studies Association, October 6–10, Toronto.
Freyre, Gilberto
1946 The Masters and the Slaves: A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilization. New 
York: A. A. Knopf.
P6751.indb   199 9/4/15   12:17:39 PM
200 Latin American Research Review
Gallego, Aina
2010 “Understanding Unequal Turnout: Education and Voting in Comparative Perspec-
tive.” Electoral Studies 29 (2): 239–248.
Hanchard, Michael G.
1994 Orpheus and Power: The Movimento Negro of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, Brazil, 1945–
1988. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Htun, Mala
2004 “From ‘Racial Democracy’ to Affi rmative Action: Changing State Policy on Race in 
Brazil.” Latin American Research Review 39 (1): 60–89.
Hutchings, Vincent L., and Nicholas A. Valentino
2004 “The Centrality of Race in American Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science 7 (1): 
383–408.
IBGE (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografía e Estatística)
2010 Censo Demográfi co 2010. http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/estatistica/populacao/
censo2010/.
IPEA (Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada)
2000a “Esperança de vida ao nascer—brancos.” http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/.
2000b “Esperança de vida ao nascer—negros.” http://www.ipeadata.gov.br/.
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Emir Kamenica
2010 “Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset Allocation.” Journal of Public 
Economics 94 (7–8): 530–539.
Iyengar, Sheena S., and Mark R. Lepper
2000 “When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?” Jour-
nal of Personality and Social Psychology 79 (6): 995–1006.
Johnson, Ollie A., III
1998 “Racial Representation and Brazilian Politics: Black Members of the National 
 Congress, 1983–1999.” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 40 (4): 
97–118.
2006 “Locating Blacks in Brazilian Politics: Afro-Brazilian Activism, New Political Par-
ties, and Pro-Black Public Policies.” International Journal of Africana Studies 12 (2): 
170–193.
Jost, John T., Mahzarin R. Banaji, and Brian A. Nosek
2004 “A Decade of System Justifi cation Theory: Accumulated Evidence of Conscious and 
Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo.” Political Psychology 25 (6): 881–919.
Lamounier, Bolivar
1968 “Raça e classe na política brasileira.” Cadernos Brasileiros 47:39–50.
LAPOP (Latin American Public Opinion Project)
2010 The AmericasBarometer. www.LapopSurveys.org.
Lenton, Alison P., and Marco Francesconi
2010 “How Humans Cognitively Manage an Abundance of Mate Options.” Psychological 
Science 21 (4): 528–533.
Lupia, Arthur
1994 “Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California 
Insurance Reform Elections.” American Political Science Review 88 (1): 63–76.
Marx, Anthony W.
1998 Making Race and Nation: A Comparison of South Africa, the United States, and Brazil. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mendelberg, Tali
2001 The Race Card: Campaign Strategy, Implicit Messages, and the Norm of Equality. Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Mitchell, Gladys Lanier
2009 “Campaign Strategies of Afro-Brazilian Politicians: A Preliminary Analysis.” Latin 
American Politics and Society 51 (3): 111–142.
2010 “Racism and Brazilian Democracy: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 33 (10): 1776–1796.
Mitchell, Michael J., and Charles H. Wood
1999 “Ironies of Citizenship: Skin Color, Police Brutality, and the Challenge to Democ-
racy in Brazil.” Social Forces 77 (3): 1001–1020.
P6751.indb   200 9/4/15   12:17:39 PM
BALLOT STRUCTURE, CANDIDATE RACE, AND VOTE CHOICE IN BRAZIL 201
Nery, Natuza, and Márcio Falcão
2011 “Dilma ofi cializa interino como Ministro dos Transportes.” Folha de São Paulo, July 11. 
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/942126-dilma-oficializa-interino-como
-ministro-dos-transportes.shtml.
Nobles, Melissa
2000 Shades of Citizenship: Race and the Census in Modern Politics. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press.
Pierson, Donald
1942 Negroes in Brazil. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Popkin, Samuel
1991 The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Presidential Campaigns. Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press.
Prandi, Reginaldo
1996 “Raça e voto na eleição de 1994.” Estudos Afro-Asiáticos 30 (December): 61–78.
Pratto, Felicia, Jim Sidanius, Lisa M. Stallworth, and Bertram F. Malle
1994 “Social Dominance Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting Social and Po-
litical Attitudes.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67 (4): 741–763.
Sansone, Livio
2003 Blackness without Ethnicity: Constructing Race in Brazil. New York: Palgrave Mac-
millan.
Sawyer, Mark Q.
2006 Racial Politics in Post-Revolutionary Cuba. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sawyer, Mark Q., Yesilernis Peña, and Jim Sidanius
2004 “Cuban Exceptionalism: Group-Based Hierarchy and the Dynamics of Patriotism 
in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba.” Du Bois Review 1 (1): 93–113.
Schwartz, Barry, Andrew Ward, John Monterosso, Sonja Lyubomirsky, Katherine White, and 
Darrin R. Lehman
2002 “Maximizing versus Satisfi cing: Happiness Is a Matter of Choice.” Journal of Person-
ality and Social Psychology 83 (5): 1178–1197.
Segato, R. L.
1998 “The Color-Blind Subject of Myth; or, Where to Find Africa in the Nation.” Annual 
Review of Anthropology 27 (1): 129–151.
Sidanius, Jim, Seymour Feshbach, Shana Levin, and Felicia Pratto
1997 “The Interface between Ethnic and National Attachment: Ethnic Pluralism or Eth-
nic Dominance?” Public Opinion Quarterly 61 (1): 102–133.
Sidanius, Jim, Yesilernis Peña, and Mark Sawyer
2001 “Inclusionary Discrimination: Pigmentocracy and Patriotism in the Dominican Re-
public.” Psychology 22:827–851.
Sidanius, Jim, and Felicia Pratto
1999 Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression. New York: 
Cambridge University Press.
Sidanius, Jim, Felicia Pratto, Colette van Laar, and Shana Levin
2004 “Social Dominance Theory: Its Agenda and Method.” Political Psychology 25 (6): 
845–880.
Silva, Graziella Moraes da, and Elisa P. Reis
2011 “Perceptions of Racial Discrimination among Black Professionals in Rio de Ja-
neiro.” Latin American Research Review 46 (2): 55–78.
Sinclair, Stacey, Jim Sidanius, and Shana Levin
1998 “The Interface between Ethnic and Social System Attachment: The Differential Ef-
fects of Hierarchy-Enhancing and Hierarchy-Attenuating Environments.” Journal 
of Social Issues 54 (4): 741–757.
Soares, Glaucio Ary Dillon, and Nelson do Valle Silva
1987 “Urbanization, Race, and Class in Brazilian Politics.” Latin American Research Re-
view 22 (2): 155–176.
Sousa, Leone Campos de, and Paulo Nascimento
2008 “Brazilian National Identity at a Crossroads: The Myth of Racial Democracy and 
the Development of Black Identity.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Soci-
ety 19 (3/4): 129–143.
P6751.indb   201 9/4/15   12:17:39 PM
202 Latin American Research Review
Tajfel, Henri
1981 Human Groups and Social Categories. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, Henri, Michael Billig, and R. P. Bundy
1971 “Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior.” European Journal of Social Psychol-
ogy 1:149–178.
Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner
1979 “An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Confl ict.” In The Social Psychology of Inter-
group Relations, ed. William G. Austin and Stephen Worchel, 33–47. Monterey, CA: 
Brooks/Cole.
Tannenbaum, Frank
1947 Slave and Citizen, the Negro in the Americas. New York: A. A. Knopf.
Telles, Edward E.
2004 Race in Another America: The Signifi cance of Skin Color in Brazil. Princeton, NJ: Prince-
ton University Press.
2007 “Race and Ethnicity and Latin America’s United Nations Millennium Development 
Goals.” Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies 2 (2): 185–200.
Wade, Peter
1997 Race and Ethnicity in Latin America. London: Pluto Press.
P6751.indb   202 9/4/15   12:17:39 PM
